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BILATERAL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS - 1913-1980
PY.C. Haanappel*
Bilateral air transport agreements are international trade agreements'
in which governmental authorities of two sovereign States attempt to
regulate the performance of air services between their respective territories'
and beyond,3 in some cases. Most bilateral air transport agreements deal only
with scheduled international air services, although in more recent years
non-scheduled or charter air services, have increasingly been included in
bilateral agreements. The agreements have been either in separate charter
bilaterals, or together with scheduled air services in the same agreement.4
Pre-World War II international air services were not always performed
pursuant to bilateral agreements. Often, services were performed without
any formal understanding. Governments sometimes gave concessions directly
to foreign airlines in order to increase service. An example would be the case
of Pan American's services to Latin America.
The phenomenon of bilateralism in international civil aviation was in
existence as early as 1913 when France and Germany had entered into a
bilateral agreement relating to aerial navigation.5 Most pre-World War II
bilateral air transport agreements, however, were made after the signing of
the Paris Convention6 in 1919 and were concurrent with the development of
scheduled international air services. The first regular scheduled interna-
tional air service in the world was inaugurated on March 22, 1919 between
Paris and Brussels. At first, most of the agreements were those made by the
signatory nations with nations not party to the Paris, Madrid7 and Havana
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1. Bilateral air transport agreements may take the form of treaties, executive
agreements or be effectuated by an exchange of diplomatic notes. See infra at 263-64.
2. Most bilateral air transport agreements define "territory" in approximately
the same fashion or by mere reference to Article 2 of the Chicago Convention (Conven-
tion on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, ICAO Doc. 2187, 39).
3. "and beyond" is added for those bilateral air transport agreements which ex-
change fifth freedom traffic rights. See p. 244 infra.
4. See p. 244 infra.
5. Cf. Rolland, L'Accord Franco-Allemand du 26 juillet 1913 rlatif e la naviga-
tion adrienne, 20 REVUE G9N9RALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 697 (1913).
6. Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation (1919).
7. Ibero-American Convention Relating to Aerial Navigation (1926).
(241)
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Conventions.' They explicitly or implicitly granted rights for the carriage by
air of persons and goods from one country to another.9 At that time, and in
view of the liberal terms of Article 15 of the Paris Convention, the possibility
was still open that nations might adopt an open-port policy for international
civil aviation just as they did and still do today for maritime shipping.
Gradually, the formation of bilateral air transport agreements prolifer-
ated between the contracting parties to the Paris, Madrid and Havana
multilateral conventions. By the latter part of the 1930s, traffic rights were
often exchanged by these parties only on the basis of reciprocity.'" An
illustration of this development of agreements and relations between nations
may be drawn from pre-war U.S.-Canadian aviation relations.
The first formal Canadian-American agreement opening the possibility
for air transport services between the two countries was signed in 1929." The
agreement was wide in scope and covered not only the admission of civil
aircraft, but also the issuance of pilots' licenses and the acceptance of
certificates of air worthiness for aircraft imported as merchandise. With
regard to the admission of civil aircraft, Clause 6 of the agreement laid down
the rule that if Canadian aircraft were licensed to carry passengers and/or
cargo in Canada, they might do so also between Canada and the United
States, but not between points within the United States. Similarly, American
aircraft licensed in the United States might carry traffic between the United
States and Canada, but not between two Canadian points. No route schedule
was attached to the agreement. Without such a schedule, Clause 6
constituted a very general and extensive exchange of traffic rights. At the
time of the 1929 agreement, however, the provisions of this clause were
rarely used.
The 1929 agreement was replaced by a much more restrictive one in
1938: the Agreement Relating to Air Navigation.'2 Article III of the 1938
Agreement provided that the establishment and operation of regular air
routes or services between the territories of the contracting parties were
8. Convention on Commercial Aviation (1928).
9. Cf. Gibson, Bi-Partite Agreements on Aerial Navigation, 6 TEMPLE L. Q. 57
(1931-32).
10. Cf. Cribbett, Some International Aspects of Air Transport, 54 J. OF THE ROYAL
AERONAUTICAL Soc'Y 669 (1950).
11. Canada Treaty Series 1929 No. 13. For pre-1929 civil aviation relations be-
tween Canada and the United States, see Latchford, Aviation Relations Between the
United States and Canada Prior to Negotiation of the Air Navigation Arrangement of
1929, 2 J. OF AIR L. 335 (1931). Canada was a party to the Paris Convention and the
United States to the Havana Convention. See supra notes 6 and 8.
12. Canada Treaty Series 1938 No. 8.
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subject to the consent of such parties. For routes or services of American
carriers, Canadian consent had to be obtained and for those of Canadian
carriers, U.S. consent had to be obtained. Air transport enterprises applying
for permission to operate routes or services between Canada and the United
States were required to submit their applications through diplomatic
channels. Again, no route schedule was attached to the agreement. The
agreement itself was supplemented by another agreement: the 1939 Agree-
ment Relating to Air Transport Services." Unlike the two previous agree-
ments in 1929, Article III of this agreement provided that operating rights for
Canadian and American carriers were to be exchanged on the basis of
reciprocity. The agreement, whose validity was of a limited duration, was
renewed in 1940 and 1943.1'
EVENTS LEADING TO THE BERMUDA AGREEMENT OF 1946: 1944-1946
The Bermuda Agreement of February 1946,'" [hereinafter referred to as
Bermuda 1], was the bilateral air transport agreement between the United
States and the United Kingdom which would become the model for the
world's bilateral air transport agreements for a period of some thirty years
until Bermuda 2 replaced it in 1977. The two most significant events in the
period from 1944 to 1946, which paved the way for Bermuda 1, were the
Chicago Conference of late 1944"6 and the founding of the International Air
Transport Association [hereinafter referred to as IATA] in April 1945."
Discussions on the economics of post-World War II civil aviation at the
Chicago Conference were dominated by a profound difference of opinion
between the two big aviation powers at the time: the United States and the
United Kingdom. The latter, whose extensive pre-war air fleet had largely
been destroyed during the war, was in favor of a system of intergovernmental
economic regulation of civil aviation in order to give every nation a "fair
share" of the international air transport market. The former, whose air fleet
was strong at the end of the war, advocated a system of free competition. No
compromise could be worked out and the Chicago Convention," the principal
product of the Conference, would eventually provide that "no scheduled
international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a
13. Canada Treaty Series 1939 No. 10.
14. Canada Treaty Series 1940 No. 13 and 1943 No. 4.
15. T.I.A.S. 1507.
16. See supra note 2 and text at 243-47.
17. International Air Transport Operators Conference, Havana (April 16-19,
1945).
18. See supra note 2.
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contracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization of
that State.'"' With respect to non-scheduled international air services, however,
the Chicago Convention was somewhat more liberal. For these services, the
rights of overflight and stops for non-traffic purposes - the so-called first two
freedoms of the air - were exchanged multilaterally between contracting
states.' A further exchange of commercial traffic rights for such non-
scheduled air services, relatively infrequent in practice at the time of the
Chicago Conference, was also included in the Convention, but never became a
reality due to the restrictive interpretation given by contracting states to the
relevant provision in the Convention.2'
In addition to the Convention, the Conference also produced the
International Air Services Transit Agreement' and the International Air
Transport Agreement.' The Transit Agreement, like the Convention itself,
widely ratified by nations, exchanged the first two freedoms of the air for
scheduled international air services.2" The Transport Agreement, drafted
mainly upon American insistence, was virtually a dead letter due to lack of
ratification. The United States itself withdrew from the Agreement in 1946.1
The Transport Agreement exchanged all five freedoms of the air for
scheduled international air services. In addition to the technical rights of
overflight and non-traffic stops (freedoms one and two), the following
commercial rights were exchanged multilaterally: the privilege to put down
passengers, mail and cargo in a contracting state which were taken on in the
territory of the state whose nationality the aircraft possessed' (third freedom;
out-bound traffic); the privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo in a
contracting state destined for the territory of the state whose nationality the
aircraft possessed 7 (fourth freedom; in-bound traffic); and the privilege to
take on passengers, mail and cargo in a contracting state destined for the
territory of any other contracting state as well as the privilege to put down
passengers, mail and cargo in a contracting state which was coming from any
such territory" (fifth freedom; and beyond transit traffic).
19. Article 6.
20. Article 5().
21. Article 5(2). See p. 257 infra. See also Haanappel, The International Air Trans-
port Association "IATA" and the International Charter Airlines, 3 ANNALS OF AIR AND
SPACE L. 143, 144 (1978).
22. See supra note 2, at 67. [Hereinafter referred to as Transit Agreement.]
23. See supra note 2, at 71. IHereinafter referred to as Transport Agreement.1
24. Article I, s.1.
25. Dept. of State Press Release No. 510 (July 25, 1946).
26. Article I, s.1(3).
27. Article I, s.1(4).
28. Article I, s.1(5).
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Due to lack of ratification of the Transport Agreement, the sum total of
the impact of the Chicago Conference in the economic field consisted of a
multilateral exchange of the first two freedoms of the air, for scheduled air
services in the Transit Agreement and for non-scheduled air services in the
Convention itself. Important matters such as capacity of traffic, frequency of
flights and air tariffs were left open, even in the aborted Transport
Agreement. Soon after the Chicago Conference, the airlines themselves took
the initiative and created IATA for the international regulation of rates and
fares. IATA, the follow-up organization to the pre-war International Air
Traffic Association, was founded as an association of scheduled international
airlines in April 1945,29 equipped with the machinery for the determination of
scheduled international air fares and rates (the IATA Traffic Conferences) by
IATA's first Annual General Meeting of September 1945,11 and incorporated
as a Canadian corporation in December 1945. 31
The Standard Form of Agreement for Provisional Air Routes is a
noteworthy product of the Chicago Conference which also contributed to
preparing the way for the Bermuda Agreement of 1946. This early
agreement, sometimes referred to as the Standard "Chicago" Agreement, was
drafted by the Chicago Conference as a non-binding model for bilateral air
transport agreements between sovereign states." The main feature of a
Standard "Chicago" Agreement is the bilateral exchange of air traffic rights
between two nations on specific routes, laid down in an annex to the
agreement. The agreement and its annex, however, are silent on the
questions of capacity, frequencies and tariffs, leaving these matters to free
competition between the airlines duly designated under the agreement by the
contracting parties to perform the agreed air services. It is evident that such
bilateral exchange of traffic rights on specific routes, without further
economic restrictions, was attractive to the United States, competition-
minded as it was at the time of the Chicago Conference. It is therefore not
surprising that shortly after the Conference the United States entered into a
number of such liberal Standard "Chicago" Agreements, most of which were
to be abrogated soon after the conclusion of the Bermuda Agreement of 1946,
which then became the model for United States, as well as other, bilateral air
transport agreements. In their annexes, all except one of the Standard
29. See supra note 17.
30. "Provisions for the Regulation and Conduct of the IATA Traffic Conferences."
For further details on the Chicago Conference and the creation of IATA, See Haanap-
pel, Ratemaking in International Air Transport. A Legal Analysis of International Air
Fares and Rates, Kluwer, The Netherlands, (1978).
31. 9-10 Geo. VI, c.51 (1945), amended by 23 Eliz. II, c.26 (1977).
32. See supra note 2, at 19:
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"Chicago" Agreements concluded by the United States exchanged all five
freedoms of the air. The sole exception was the agreement of 1945"3 between
the United States and Canada, which only exchanged the first four freedoms
of the air. It only contained in its annex U.S.-Canada routes without traffic
rights to points beyond the territories of the contracting parties. At the time
of the conclusion of the U.S.-Canada agreement of 1945, Newfoundland, then
an essential link in any U.S.-Europe route, did not yet form part of the
Canadian Confederation. When, in 1949, Newfoundland became a Canadian
Province, a new agreement - and this time a Bermuda-type, U.S.-Canada
bilateral agreement - was signed. The agreement included inter alia a U.S.
route to Gander, Newfoundland, with traffic rights to points beyond.' Some of
the ancillary provisions of the Standard "Chicago" Agreement reappeared in
the Bermuda 1 and Bermuda-type agreements. They are evident in the
provisions on designation of air carriers; charges for the use of airport and
other facilities, importation of fuel, lubricating oils and spare parts;
recognition of certificates of air worthiness, competency and licensing;
application of laws and regulations of one contracting party to the aircraft of
the other; registration of the agreement with the [Provisional] International
Civil Aviation Organization [hereinafter [P]ICAO];l termination of the
agreement upon one year's notice; and substantial ownership and effective
control of an airline by the nationals of its state of registration.38
BERMUDA 1
On the eve of the Bermuda Agreement of February 1946, between the
United States and the United Kingdom, the stage was set for change. The
Chicago Conference had been unable to resolve many economic issues of
international civil aviation, such as the exchange of third, fourth and, in
particular, fifth freedom traffic rights, capacity, frequencies and tariffs. The
airlines themselves had founded IATA and given it a ratemaking machinery
through the Traffic Conferences. Finally, the United States had entered into
a number of liberal Standard "Chicago" Agreements, but with less important
aviation powers than the United Kingdom or France. The final events which
brought Britain and the United States to the negotiating table at Bermuda
were the desire of American carriers to increase their frequencies to London
33. Canada Treaty Series 1945 No. 2.
34. Canada Treaty Series 1949 No. 14.
35. See supra note 2 (Article 83).
36. The "substantial ownership and effective control" provision of bilateral air
transport agreements avoids the "flags of convenience" problems which have plagued
international shipping over the years.
BILATERAL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS
beyond the limits allowed by the pre-war bilateral arrangements still in force
in early 194611 and, in the fall of 1945, the announcement by Pam Am of its
intention to cut considerably fares from the United States to Britain and
France. These intentions had met with fierce French and British resistance.
Under these circumstances, a compromise was reached whereby the Amer-
icans accepted governmental tariff control, which they had been unwilling to
do at Chicago in 1944, and whereby the British accepted the idea that
airlines themselves would fix capacity and frequencies of flights, instead of
following the system which they had proposed in 1944 and which involved
intergovernmental pre-determination of capacity and frequencies. Some say
that the compromise was perfectly acceptable to both parties. Others say that
it had only become possible by the promise of an American loan to rebuild the
British aviation industry. Wherever the truth may lie, and it probably lies in
the middle, in the long run, Bermuda 1 proved to be satisfactory to both the
Americans and the British. On September 19, 1946, they issued a joint
statement proclaiming the Bermuda Agreement as the model for all bilateral
air transport agreements to be concluded by the two countries. In practice,
however, the Americans remained faithful to the Bermuda principles longer
than the British.38
Much has been written on Bermuda 1.11 The agreement itself in articles 2
to 14 which repeats, and somewhat elaborates, upon the ancillary Standard
"Chicago" Agreement provisions mentioned earlier. Article 1 of the agree-
ment exchanges traffic rights between the contracting parties.
The annexes to the agreement reveal what this exchange of traffic rights
involves. Annex 1 defines the rights exchanged as rights of transit, stops for
non-traffic purposes, commercial entry and departure for international traffic
in passengers, cargo and mail. These rights are exchanged on the air routes as
specified in Annex III or as amended in accordance with Annex IV. Annex II
contains the agreement's ratemaking provisions. The Final Act of the
agreement includes a resolution on capacity and frequency.40 The Bermuda 1
innovations and most important provisions are to be found in the Annexes
and in the Final Act rather than in the agreement itself.
37. For the prewar American-British bilateral air transport agreements, see SHAW-
CROSS AND BEAUMONT AIR LAW, 69 (1945).
38. See note 67 infra.
39. See Baker, The Bermuda Plan as the Basis for a Multilateral Agreement, lec-
ture delivered at McGill Univ., April 18, 1947, reprinted in part in CIIAYES, EHR.ICII
AND LOWENFELD, I INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY
COURSE 498 (1968).
40. Annex V deals with the technical matter of "change of gauge."
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Annex III shows a large number of scheduled air routes between the
United States and the United Kingdom. This is not surprising in view of the
fact that at the time of the Bermuda Agreement Britain still possessed many
colonies. The considerable number of intermediate points with traffic rights
and fifth freedom routes can easily be explained by the fact that aircraft in
1946 were only capable of relatively short-haul flights and that third
countries with little aviation potential were more readily willing to grant
permission to British and American carriers to serve their countries without
restrictions than they are today.
Annex II on rates and fares is rather complicated. Paragraph (a) contains
the principle that fares and rates for traffic between the United States and
the United Kingdom are subject to the approval of American and British
aeronautical authorities. To that end, fares and rates must, pursuant to
paragraph (c), be filed by the carriers with the aeronautical authorities of the
two countries at least thirty days before their proposed date of introduction.
According to paragraph (b), carriers may, in determining their fares and
rates, use the ratemaking machinery of the newly-created IATA which,
pursuant to the same paragraph, the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
approved for a one year period on February 19, 1946." This approval relieved
the machinery from the operation of the U.S. antitrust laws and the approval
was renewed on a year to year basis until 1955, when it was made
permanent.42 This permanent approval is still valid, except for the North
Atlantic region, where it was withdrawn for U.S. carriers in 1979,11 after
proceedings in the so-called CAB Show Cause Order." In those proceedings,
the CAB had announced it would withdraw all antitrust immunity from
IATA's ratemaking machinery, unless interested parties would come forward
with convincing arguments to the contrary. A final decision on the Show
Cause Order, and in fact, on the survival of the IATA ratemaking machinery,
is not expected until 1981. The true importance of paragraph (b), repeated in
slightly different words in most of the world's bilateral air transport
agreements, is a governmental delegation of ratemaking power to IATA,
subject to government approval of individual IATA fares and rates. In
determining rates and fares to be filed with aeronautical authorities, the rule
of reason as to tariff levels of paragraph (h) of Annex II must be followed. In
the event of governmental disapproval of fares and rates, inability on the part
of IATA to agree on fares and rates, or nonavailability of the IATA
41. CAB Reports 639 (1946).
42. CAB Order E-9305 (1955).
43. CAB Order announced on Dec. 5, 1979, CAB Order 80-4-113, April 15, 1980.
44. CAB Order 78-6-78, June 12, 1978.
45. See p. 266 infra.
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ratemaking machinery due to government disapproval of the machinery or
otherwise (paragraph (d)), Annex II contains two alternate procedures: the
paragraph (e) procedure applicable in the event of full CAB power to fix
international air tariffs, and the paragraph (f) procedure applicable in the
event of less than full CAB international ratemaking power. Although in
paragraph (j) of Annex II the U.S. government promised to do its best to give
the CAB full international ratemaking power, this promise never material-
ized and it has always been paragraph (f) that was applicable. In fact, the
CAB never received more from Congress than the power to suspend and reject
international air tariffs. It did not receive the power to fix them. The
suspension and rejection power was only granted in 1972. Paragraph (f)
gives a contracting state in the event of tariff disputes the power "to take
such steps as it may consider necessary to prevent the inauguration or
continuation of the service in question at the rate complained of." Post-
Bermuda 1 U.S. bilaterals often only contain the paragraph (f) type procedure
and then sometimes add to the above quote: "provided, however, that the
contracting Party raising the objection shall not require the charging of a
rate higher than the lowest rate charged by its own airline or airlines for
comparable services between the same points."
The strong language of paragraph (f) is, in fact, a paper tiger on the side
of the United States since it is held that this provision does not in and of itself
give the CAB the power to intervene in international fare disputes. That
power must be derived from U.S. domestic legislation, such as the Federal
Aviation Act,4" which, as seen earlier, never gave the CAB more power than
the suspension and rejection of international air tariffs., Finally, paragraph
(g) of Annex II gives contracting parties the possibility to submit their
disputes to IP]ICAO for an advisory report.
46. Pub. L. No. 92-259, 86 Stat. 95 (1972), adding sub-section (j) to Section 1002 of
the Federal Aviation Act. Before 1972, the CAB only had power in relation to discri-
minatory international air tariffs: See § 1002(f) of the Federal Aviation Act. The CAB's
full tariff powers in relation to domestic aviation, see § 1002(d) of the Federal Aviation
Act, were severely curtailed in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
504, 92 Stat. 1705. The CAB's powers over international air tariffs have in their turn
been diminished by the International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94 Stat. 34. See AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY 27 (Feb. 11,
1980).
47. See supra note 46.
48. How limited CAB power was over international air tariffs before the granting
of the suspension and rejection authority in 1972 is evidenced by the so-called Chandler
Fare Controversy over North Atlantic tariffs in 1962-63. See LOWENFELD, 3 AVIATION
LAW 31-78 (1972).
249
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The capacity resolution of the Final Act of Bermuda 1 is well-known and
can be found repeated almost literally in many of the post-Bermuda 1
bilateral air transport agreements:
1. Air transport facilities available to the travelling public must bear a
close relationship to the requirements of the public for air transport
(paragraph 3);
2. there must be fair and equal opportunity for the carriers to operate on
the agreed air routes (paragraph 4);
3. carriers of one country shall take into consideration the interests of
the carriers of the other country so as not to affect unduly each other's
services (paragraph 5); and
4. the primary objective of the provision of capacity is to meet traffic
demands between the country of nationality of the air carrier and the country
of ultimate destination of the traffic (mostly third and fourth freedom traffic),
with subsidiary fifth freedom traffic capacity related to the traffic require-
ments between the country of origin and the country of destination of air
traffic, requirements of through airline operation and traffic requirements of
the area through which the airlines pass after taking account of local and
regional services (paragraph 6). The vagueness of these provisions is striking.
The drafters of Bermuda 1 certainly did not have the intention of dividing
traffic between American and British carriers on a 50-50 percent basis. It was
more truly unfair competition between the carriers of the two nations that
they wished to avoid. In the event of governmental dissatisfaction with
capacity as offered by the air carrier, a system of regular and frequent
consultation between the aeronautical authorities involved is provided for in
paragraph 9, in addition to the consultation, dispute and denunciation
provisions of articles 8, 9 and 14 of the agreement. This consultation
mechanism is the so-called ex post facto review procedure of capacity which is
often cited as one of the essential elements of Bermuda 1. In many
post-Bermuda 1, U.S. bilaterals, it has become necessary to somewhat clarify
and elaborate upon this mechanism. It is often provided that contracting
parties may not unilaterally impose any restriction on capacity, frequency,
scheduling or type of aircraft to be used on the agreed air routes. It is also
often provided that consultation may be requested to review operations in
order to establish whether they are in conformity with the Bermuda 1
principles and for that purpose, statistics will be maintained by the
aeronautical authorities of the contracting parties. 9
49. Cf. Stoffel, American Bilateral Air Transport Agreements on the Threshold of
the Jet Transport Age, 26 J. OF AIR L. AND COM. 119, 126, (1959); McCarroll, The Ber-
muda Capacity Clauses in the Jet Age, 29 J. OF AIR L. AND COM. 115, 118 (1963).
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IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF BILATERAL
AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS FOLLOWING
BERMUDA 1: 1946-1977
In September 1946, the Americans and British issued a joint statement
proclaiming Bermuda 1 as the model for their future bilateral air transport
agreements. A large number of third states followed suit in the years after
1946 by concluding Bermuda-type agreements. Bermuda 1 soon became the
accepted standard bilateral air transport agreement in the post-World War II
period. As shall be seen later,' most deviations from the Bermuda model
occurred in the field of capacity and frequency clauses. The United States, at
least until Bermuda 2 in 1977, stayed faithful to the original Bermuda
principles. One of the major exceptions is the U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement of
1966,"' where all commercial aspects of air services between the two
countries, including capacity and tariffs, were made subject to a prior
agreement between the designated airlines (Pan Am and Aeroflot) which, in
turn, was subject to prior governmental approval. 2
When compared with Bermuda 1, post-Bermuda agreements appear
considerably streamlined. All substantive provisions can usually be found in
the body of the agreement and only the route schedule is contained in an
annex. Route schedules with increasingly more precise routes for each
nation's carriers have remained a feature of almost all post-war bilaterals.
Only during the negotiations leading to the 1974 revision of the U.S.-Canada
bilateral agreement of 1966' was a new and interesting system proposed.
That proposal was never implemented. The system would have provided for
the automatic introduction of new routes, once traffic potential would warrant
them." The United States and Canada remained faithful to the traditional
route schedule system. The only peculiarity was the gradual introduction of
new routes over a period of five years.'
50. See p. 253 infra.
51. Civil Air Transport Agreement between the Government of the U.S.A. and the
Government of the U.S.S.R., DEP'T OF STATE BULL, 791 (Nov. 21, 1966).
52. Articles 2-4.
53. Air Transport Agreement between the Government of the U.S.A. and the Gov-
ernment of Canada (Ottawa, Jan. 17, 1966), amended by Exchange of Notes, (May 8,
1974), TIAS 7824.
54. Cf. Proceedings of the Standing Senate (Canada) Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 3
FOREIGN AFF. 26-43 (1974).
55. See supra note 53. At the same time as the revision of the 1966 agreement
(like the 1949 agreement, see supra note 34 and text thereto, a Bermuda - type agree-
ment), Canada and the United States entered into a Non-Scheduled Air Service Agree-
ment and a customs and immigration Preclearance Agreement. See T.I.A.S. 7824.
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The original Bermuda agreement, like the Standard "Chicago" Agree-
ment, had provided for a system of multiple designation. Multiple designation
permits each nation to designate one or more carriers to perform air services
under the air transport agreement. Many post-Bermuda agreements contain
the system of single designation. As its name suggests, this system allows
each nation to choose one carrier to perform the air services in question.
Generally speaking, nations with more than one international air carrier,
including the United States, insist upon multiple designation. In agreements
between nations with only one international carrier each, the system of
single designation is prevalent. Some countries with more than one
international airline, however, have divided the world geographically be-
tween their carriers; the nations can easily agree to a system of single
designation since there will be only one international carrier flying to a
particular country. This is the case for Canada. Canada has divided the world
into "spheres of influence" for Air Canada and CP Air,' respectively.
Post-Bermuda route schedules also show a gradual disappearance of
intermediate points, due to the development of long range aircraft, and a
similar disappearance of fifth freedom routes, due to the creation of
international airlines in most of the world's nations. Sixth freedom traffic,
not specifically provided for in most Bermuda-type agreements, has often
caused major problems in bilateral aviation relations. Sixth freedom traffic is
that kind of fifth freedom traffic which an airline picks up abroad, transports
to its own country and then transports onwards, in transit, to third countries.
Sixth freedom traffic can also be regarded as a combination of third and.
fourth freedom traffic under two different bilateral agreements."
Country X - Transit point Country Y
fourth freedom Country Z third freedom
----------------------------------.
sixth freedom
On some occasions the United States has attempted to limit the volume of
sixth freedom traffic, carried by foreign air carriers out of the United States
to the home country of the foreign airline involved and beyond, in transit, to
56. Statement on Air Policy (Nov. 23, 1973) (principles 6, 7 and 8).
57. For the definition of third, fourth and fifth freedom traffic, see supra at 244.
58. If sixth freedom traffic is carried between two countries without stopping at
the transit point, it is sometimes called the seventh freedom traffic. Such is, for inst-
ance, the case for non-stop flights by the Icelandic carrier between New York/Chicago
and Luxemburg.
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points in third countries. Under the U.S.-Canada agreement, for instance,
sixth freedom traffic potential may only be advertised by the airlines
involved under certain conditions.59 Furthermore, under a 1969 amendment
to the 1957 U.S.-Netherlands agreement' and a 1966 amendment to the 1944
U.S.-Sweden agreement,"1 it was stipulated that the primary objective of
capacity provision only included sixth freedom traffic, if such traffic stopped
over at the transit point in the home country of the carrier involved for
twelve hours or more.
With respect to post-Bermuda route schedules, one should also mention the
gradual appearance of all-cargo routes. The original Bermuda 1 had provided
for specific air routes for the carriage of passengers, cargo and mail.2
Generally, this has been interpreted' or specified in subsequent agreements
as meaning passengers, cargo and mail, "separately or in combination." The
development of all-cargo planes, however, has sometimes led to the inclusion
of separate all-cargo routes in schedules to bilateral agreements.'
The original Bermuda agreement provided for non-binding aribtration
through [P]ICAO in the event of disputes. 5 Many subsequent agreements
provide for [non-]binding arbitration through ad hoc tribunals, composed of
three arbitrators - one to be appointed by each contracting party, and the
third by the two arbitrators so appointed or, if they cannot agree, but either
the President of the International Court of Justice or the President of the
ICAO Council.
CAPACITY AND FREQUENCY
66
The United States has generally remained faithful to the liberal
Bermuda 1 capacity clauses. Many other nations, often including the United
Kingdom, 6' have not remained faithful. Many nations have, in fact, turned
59. See supra note 53 (Article 3(d)).
60. T.I.A.S. 6796. See Haanappel, Background of the Dutch-American Aviation
Conflict, 1 ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE L. 63, 69 (1976).
61. CATC (55) 195 c.
62. See supra note 15 (Annex I).
63. Cf. Italy-U.S. Air Transport Arbitration: Advisory Opinion of the Arbitral Tri-
bunal (Given at Geneva, July 17, 1965) Constituted in Virtue of the Compromise
Signed at Rome on June 30, 1964 by the Governments of the U.S.A. and of the Italian
Republic, reprinted in 4 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 974 (1965).
64. Cf. Wassenbergh, Aspects of Air Law and Civil Air Policy in the Seventies 59
Nijhoff, The Hague (1970).
65. See supra note 15. (Article 9).
66. See generally Handbook on Capacity Clauses in Bilateral Air Transport Agree-
ments, ICAO Circ. 72-AT/9 (1965).
67. See British Air Transport in the Seventies, Report of the Committee of Inquiry
into Civil Air Transport, Appendix 5 (The Edwards Report 1969).
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away from the liberal Bermuda capacity provisions and replaced them, in one
form or another, by the system of predetermination of capacity. Every
predetermination system requires prior governmental approval of capacity
before air services can commence. Sometimes this approval is limited to total
capacity only. More often the approval relates not only to total capacity, but
also to frequency of flights, scheduling of flights and/or types of aircraft to be
used. Predetermination clauses can take one of two forms: the bilateral air
transport agreement which repeats the Bermuda capacity principles, but
makes them subject to a priori rather than ex post facto governmental
review;" or, the bilateral agreement which contains some other capacity
principle, such as reciprocity, 9 subject to prior governmental approval. The
system of governmental approval itself can also take one of two forms:
individual airlines must seek prior governmental approval of capacity and
frequency; or the designated airlines must reach an inter-carrier agreement
on capacity and related matters, subject to prior governmental approval.
Where bilateral air transport agreements require an inter-carrier
agreement on capacity (and related matters), they sometimes go further and
require, encourage or permit a commercial pooling agreement between the
designated airlines. Such a pooling agreement, in its simplest form, can be
described as an agreement for the sharing of revenues derived from the joint
operation of an air route or air routes by two or more carriers. At the heart of
every pooling agreement, there is a capacity agreement between airlines. On
the basis of that capacity agreement, it is then further agreeed between the
participating airlines that they will put revenues derived from the joint
operation of an air route or air routes into one and the same fund, to be
68. See, e.g., Australian Standard Draft (1975) Agreement, Article 8, in 2 Review of
Australia's International Civil Aviation Policy 310-11 (Australian Government Pub-
lishing Service, 1978).
69. Reciprocity is insisted upon by, for instance, many Latin American States. The
reciprocity principle can sometimes be found in Europe. European bilaterals, like Cana-
dian ones, show little uniformity with respect to capacity clauses. Particular agreements
seem to be related to particular aviation relations. Generally, however, one can say
that Canadian bilaterals become more and more pre-determination minded, whereas in
Europe Grosso modo, Scandinavia and the Netherlands are in favour of liberal capacity
provisions, Central Western European countries have a mixed system of liberal and
predetermination capacity provisions, and Southern European countries usually
adhere to protectionist (predetermination) capacity principles. Some uniformity in
European bilateral air transport agreements has arisen from the European Civil Avia-
tion Conference (ECAC) Standard Clauses for Bilateral Agreements. ECAC adopted
these clauses in 1959 and recommended them to member states for use in their future
bilateral agreements. The clauses, however, are silent on the questions of capacity and
frequency. For their text, see Handbook on Administrative Clauses in Bilateral Air
Transport Agreements, ICAO Circ. 63-AT/6, 116 (1962).
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divided between the carriers in accordance with a predetermined formula."0
Commercial pooling, whether compulsory or authorized under bilateral
agreements or even without authorization in the bilateral agreement, is very
common in all parts of the world, with one exception, namely, on air routes
within, to, from, or via the United States. The CAB has consistently held
commercial pooling to be anti-competitive, adverse to the public interest and
has not wanted to relieve it from the operation of the U.S. antitrust laws
under Sections 412 and 414 of the Federal Aviation Act. 7'
Capacity control through a system of governmental predetermination
and/or through pooling between airlines severely limits free competition in
international air transport. In fact, when capacity control is coupled with
tariff control, as it most often is, 7 there is almost no competition left between
airlines. This loss of competition may have an adverse influence on the level
of service offered to the travelling public. Such an influence adverse to the
interests of the public is one of the reasons why the United States has always
resisted capacity control and more recently, questioned tariff control.73 In
Europe, where capacity and tariff control have very often been combined, the
Commission of the European Economic Community (EEC) is now engaged in
a study on the liberalization of air transport regulation. 7
TARIFFS
In the field of tariff clauses, most nations have stayed more faithful to
the Bermuda 1 principles than they have with respect to capacity and
frequency. Most bilateral air transport agreements make tariffs subject to
prior governmental approval and delegate the determination of tariffs in the
first instance to the carriers involved. A majority of bilateral agreements
then stipulates further that carriers, in determining their- tariffs to be
submitted to aeronautical authorities for approval, may use or shall use
"wherever possible" the ratemaking machinery of IATA. A smaller group of
bilaterals does not mention IATA specifically. Instead, this group refers more
generally to "an association" of international airlines to be used by the
70. On pooling agreements, see Summary of Material Collected on Co-Operative
Agreements and Arrangements, ICAO Circ. 84-AT/14 (1967).
71. See supra note 46. As an emergency measure in times of fuel shortage, the
CAB has in the past often approved capacity reduction agreements between airlines.
These agreements, however, did not provide for the sharing of revenues. For capacity
agreements in U.S. domestic and international air transport, see CAB Order 75-7-98,
July 21, 1975.
72. See p. 262 infra.
73. See p. 261 infra.
74. Bulletin of the European Communities, Suppl. 5/79.
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carriers for the determination of their tariffs. A minority of bilateral
agreements delegates ratemaking simply to the designated airlines involved,
subject to prior governmental approval. This is particularly true for those few
countries whose national carrier(s) is not affiliated with IATA.5
It is most fortunate that very few bilateral air transport agreements have
made the use of IATA's Traffic Conferences compulsory. Usually recourse to
IATA's ratemaking machinery is optional. Bilateral agreements provide for
alternate ratemaking procedures in the event of a breakdown of the IATA
machinery, non-availability of the machinery or governmental disapproval of
IATA tariffs."8 This may not have been of paramount importance in the early
days of post-Bermuda 1 bilaterals, when IATA was generally able to agree on
worldwide fares and rates acceptable to a majority of governmental author-
ities. It did, however, become important in the 60s and the 70s, when IATA
became increasingly unable to agree on tariffs internally and to convince
governmental authorities of the validity of the tariffs which it did adopt. In
the 60s, IATA's main problem was to cope with non-IATA charter competi-
tion. In the 70s, the problems were the fuel crises (shortage and price
increases), temporary overcapacity resulting from the introduction of wide-
bodied jets and the U.S. drive towards a more competitive system of airline
pricing."
In the international tariff field, one multilateral agreement was con-
cluded - the 1967 International Agreement on the procedure for the
establishment 'of tariffs for scheduled air services.8 The Agreement was
reached within the framework of the European Civil Aviation Conference
(hereinafter referred to as ECAC), but is open for accession by any member
state of the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies. 9 For
contracting parties, the provisions of the Agreement override tariff provisions
in existing bilateral agreements. 0 In general, the Agreement repeats the
Bermuda 1 tariff clauses and gives strong endorsement, both in the preamble
and in the body of the agreement,8' to the ratemaking procedures of IATA.
Unlike many agreements, and the early bilateral agreements in particular,
the ECAC's agreement specifically defined the term "tariff."82 Provision was
75. Cf. Haanappel, supra note 30, p. 18.
76. For the standard U.S. clauses, see supra at 245.
77. Cf. Haanappel, supra note 30, at 133.
78. Signed at Paris, July 10, 1967, ICAO Doc. 8681.
79. Article 8.
80. Article 1.
81. Article 2(3).
82. Article 2(1). Tariff means "prices to be paid for the carriage of passengers,
baggage and freight and the conditions under which those prices apply, including prices
and conditions for agency and other auxiliary services, but excluding remuneration or
conditions for the carriage of mail."
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made for implicit or explicit' government approval of tariffs. An interesting
detail of the agreements is that, in the event of governmental disputes over
tariffs, old tariffs shall remain in force until new ones have been established
or until twelve months after the date on which they would normally have
expired, whichever is sooner.' This last provision can be found not only in the
1967 Agreement, but also in many bilateral air transport agreements all over
the world. It differs from the U.S. standard clause that in the event of
disputes, every contracting state can "take such steps as it may consider
necessary ..
CHARTERS"
The first paragraph of Article 5 of the Chicago Convention87 contains a
multilateral exchange of the first two freedoms of the air for non-scheduled
(charter) international air services. The second paragraph exchanges multila-
terally the three remaining freedoms of the air - the commercial ones - for
non-scheduled international air services, but adds that any state may impose
"such regulations, conditions or limitations" upon this exchange "as it may
consider desirable." States have, in fact, used this limitations clause so
extensively that in practice prior permission for commercial charter flights is
almost always required. In this fashion, Article 5(2) has become virtually
inoperative, limiting the importance of Article 5 as a whole to the
multilateral exchange of freedoms one and two. Not only is there a lack of
multilateral exchange of commercial rights for international charter air
services,' there is also a lack of bilateral exchange of such rights. Bilateral
air transport agreements, with the exception of some recent U.S. agree-
ments,89 only cover scheduled international air services. In the absence of a
multilateral or bilateral regime, international charter flights are governed
both by the administrative rules of the country of origin of the charter air
83. Article 2(5). "[A pproval may be given expressly. If neither of the aeronautical
authorities has expressed disapproval ...tariffs shall be considered as approved."
84. Article 2(8).
85. See supra at xx. Many provisions of the 1967 Agreement, see supra note 78 and
text thereto, go back to Article 7 of the ECAC Standard Clauses. See supra note 69.
86. See generally Haanappel, supra note 21.
87. See supra note 2.
88. With the exception of two regional multilateral charter agreements of limited
practical importance: Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights of Non-Scheduled
Air Services in Europe, Paris, 1956, IACO Doc. 7695; Multilateral Agreement on Com-
mercial Rights of Non-Scheduled Air Services Among the Association of South East
Asian Nations, Manila, 1971 (Agreement not registered with ICAO). The League of
Arab States is preparing a similar regional charter agreement (draft agreement
adopted at Tunis, Dec. 13, 1978).
89. See p. 259 infra.
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traffic and by those of the country of destination. In practice the more
restrictive of these two sets of regulations will prevail.
At the time of the Chicago Conference and for a good number of years
thereafter, the importance of international air charters was limited. They
were usually special charters ("single-entity" charters) for the transportation
of groups such as military personnel, immigrants and pilgrims. Only during
the latter part of the 50s, but especially during the 60s and early 70s,' did
non-scheduled international air transport develop to become a true alterna-
tive to scheduled international air transport for the pleasure traveler. In the
50s and 60s, the predominant charter types were the affinity charter9 and the
Inclusive Tour Charter (ITC).92 The former prevailed on the North Atlantic
vacation market, the latter on the North-South European vacation market.
To a large extent, regulations were developed by IATA93 and as such, only
meant to apply to the charter services of scheduled IATA member airlines.
Most governments of the world, however, by means of administrative rules
and regulations, made the affinity charter and the ITC their own national
charter types, thus applicable to all carriers, whether scheduled or charter
only ("supplemental airlines"), whether members of IATA or not." In the
early 70s, states began to realize that the affinity charter, with its artificial
"interest group" requirement and the enforcement problems inherent thereto,
had become outdated, especially on the North Atlantic. In October 1972, the
United States, Canada and ECAC member states decided to replace, totally
or partially, the affinity charter by the Advance Booking Charter (hereinafter
referred to as ABC).9  This charter type is open to all members of the public
who buy their tickets through intermediaries (tour organizers) rather than
directly from the airlines involved, and must book and pay well in advance of
the date of travel (originally ninety days; now generally thirty days). In the
United States, the ABC was preceded by the Travel Group Charter
(hereinafter referred to as TGC), whose rules were slightly more restrictive
than those of the ABC. At the present time, the ABC has been replaced by
90. The peak was reached in the early 70s, when almost thirty percent of total
international air traffic was carried on charter flights.
91. In order to be eligible for an affinity charter, a passenger has to be member in
good standing of an affinity group, i.e., an organization with principal aims and pur-
poses other than travel.
92. In order to be eligible for an ITC, a passenger has to buy ground arrangements
(hotel, meals, excursions, etc.) in addition to air travel.
93. IATA Traffic Conference Resolution 045.
94. See, e.g., the 1950s editions of Part 207 of the CAB's Economic Regulations, 14
C.F.R. Part 207.
95. Text of Agreed Principles for North Atlantic Charter Flights (Ottawa Declara-
tion, Oct. 21, 1972), 68 DEPr' OF STATE BULL. 20 (1973).
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the very liberal public charter, for which there are no advance booking and
payment requirements and which is distinguishable from a scheduled air
service only in that tickets are not sold directly by the airlines, but rather by
tour organizers.'
With U.S. charter rules becoming more liberal than those of many other
countries, the United States, in the early 70s,97 started a policy of concluding
bilateral arrangements on international charters. These arrangements were
first in the form of memoranda of understandings on non-scheduled air
services" or in the form of more formal bilateral non-scheduled air services
agreements," but later charter provisions were included in bilateral air
transport agreements, covering both scheduled and non-scheduled air ser-
vices. This latter development started with Bermuda 2 in 1977.' °U ECAC has
always objected to its member States entering into bilateral charter
agreements with the United States. ECAC favors the conclusion of a
multilateral agreement on North Atlantic charters. Such a multilateral
agreement has as yet not materialized, and notwithstanding ECAC opposi-
tion, many European nations have concluded bilateral charter arrangements
with the United States.''
Whether in the form of separate charter bilaterals and memoranda of
understanding or in the form of bilateral agreements covering both scheduled
and non-scheduled flights, the underlying rule in a recent U.S. charter policy
has always been the "country of origin" rule. Under that rule, eligibility for
charter air transportation is determined exclusively by the regulations of the
country where the charter traffic originates. Charter passengers originating
in the United States are thus governed by the liberal rules of the United
States only and not by the often more restrictive rules of the country of
destination.
With the U.S. charter policy becoming increasingly liberal and the
country of origin rule applicable between the United States and many other
nations, it is somewhat paradoxical that the volume of international charter
air traffic has been dropping considerably since 1975. Cheap fares on
scheduled international air services, in large part the result of liberal
96. See CAB Docket 32242.
97. U.S. Statement on International Air Transportation Policy (Nixon Statement,
June 22, 1970) 63 DFP'T OF STATE BULL 86 (July 20, 1970).
98. Such memoranda of understanding were concluded with many European na-
tions.
99. Agreements between the United States and Canada (T.I.A.S. 7824). United
States and Jordan (T.I.A.S. 7954), United States and Yugoslavia (T.I.A.S. 7819).
100. See p. 260 infra.
101. See supra note 98; see also p. 262 infra.
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post-Bermuda 2 bilateral air transport agreements,' 2 are primarily responsi-
ble for the reduced volume.
BERMUDA 2 AND POsT-BERMUDA 2 AGREEMENTS
On June 22, 1976, the United Kingdom announced its denunciation of
the Bermuda Agreement of 1946. The termination of Bermuda 1 was to take
effect one year later, on June 22, 1977, the day on which the United States
and the United Kingdom were to reach an agreement on a new bilateral air
transport agreement, Bermuda 2. The new agreement was signed and
entered into force on July 23, 1977."0
The British denunciation of Bermuda 1 had been inspired by dissatisfac-
tion over capacity, as offered by American and British air carriers over the
North Atlantic. The United Kingdom claimed that the traffic share of Pan
Am and TWA by far exceeded that of British Airways. At the outset of the
negotiations leading up to the conclusion of Bermuda 2, the British aimed at
a new agreement, splitting U.S.-United Kingdom air traffic equally between
American and British carriers. In this attempt, the British were unsuccess-
ful. Article 11 of Bermuda 2 would repeat the liberal capacity provisions of
Bermuda 1." More generally, one can say that in the key areas of capacity,
frequency and tariffs Bermuda 2 reiterates Bermuda 1 with some elabora-
tions and minor restrictions. As to capacity, attention is drawn to the
obligation of the contracting parties to avoid overcapacity and
undercapacity' 0° and to the consultative mechanism to deal with overcapacity
on the North Atlantic.'" With respect to tariffs, Article 12 of Bermuda 2
sanctions the system of governmental approval of tariffs and the use of the
IATA ratemaking machinery. In the event of governmental dispute over
tariffs and failure of consultation thereon, contracting parties may take
action to continue in force the existing tariffs beyond the date on which they
would otherwise have expired. 7 A Working Group on tariff matters surveys
the application of the tariff provisions of the agreement.'"
102. See p. 262 infra.
103. Air Services Agreement between the Government of the U.S.A. and the Gov-
ernment of the U.K. (July 23, 1977). See Haanappel, Bermuda 2: A First Impression, 2
ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE L. 139 (1977).
104. See supra at 246.
105. Article 11(5).
106. Annex 2.
107. Article 12(7).Cf. the Bermuda 1 tariff clauses, see supra at 248.
108. Annex 3.
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The provisions of Bermuda 2 dealing with designation of airlines are
quite complicated."° In principle, there is a system of multiple designation.110
On North Atlantic routes, however, there is single designation per route, i.e.,
on each particular route there shall only be one carrier of each nation, with
the exception of two routes, where there may be multiple designation by each
nation."' It is especially on this matter of designation of carriers that Britain
got an advantage over the United States in Bermuda 2.
Bermuda 2 is innovative in that the agreement included provisions on
charter air services." 2 The development of cheap charter air services is
encouraged"' and the existing U.S.-United Kingdom Memorandum of
Understanding on Passenger Charter Air Services of April 1977 is incorpo-
rated into the agreement." '
After the conclusion of Bermuda 2, it was sometimes expected that the
agreement would take the road of its predecessor, Bermuda 1, and become
the model for modern worldwide bilateral air transport agreements. This
expectation has not materialized for two reasons. In the first place, Bermuda
2 with its often very detailed provisions proved to be geared almost
exclusively to the U.S.-United Kingdom market."' Secondly and more
importantly, the new administration in Washington,' D.C., the Carter
Administration, became heavily committed to a more freely competitive
international aviation policy than the one expressed in Bermuda 2. Whereas
Bermuda 2 espouses a policy which is perhaps slightly more restrictive than
that of Bermuda 1, the Carter administration's policy is infinitely more
liberal than was Bermuda 1. Under this policy of "deregulation," govern-
ments play a minimal role in the economic regulation of air transport.
Economic decisions and policies are left to the determination of individual
airlines and to the free forces of the marketplace.
Under this so-called "deregulation" policy, eleven new bilateral air
transport agreements or amendments to existing agreements have been
entered into by the United States in the period 1978-80.11 The first of these
109. Article 3.
110. Article 3(1)(a).
111. Article 3(2)(a)(b). Other exceptions to single designation per route are found in
Article 3(2)(b)(i)(ii). For all-cargo services, see Article 3(3).
112. See supra at 259.
113. Article 14.
114. Annex 4.
115. At the present time, U.S.-U.K. negotiations are being held to liberalize some of
the Bermuda 2 provisions; see AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY 34 (Febr. 11,
1980).
116. See AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY 20-21 (Dec. 31, 1979).
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very liberal post-Bermuda 2 agreements was reached with the Netherlands
on March 10, 1978. Since then have followed such countries as Australia,
Belgium, Fiji, Finland, West Germany, Iceland, Israel, Jamaica, Papua New
Guinea and Singapore.
Post-Bermuda 2 U.S. bilateral air transport agreements generally have
the following characteristics:
1. unlimited multiple designation of airlines;
2. a liberal route structure, i.e., U.S. airlines may serve foreign
countries from any point in the U.S., via any intermediate point and to any
beyond point;
3. free determination by the designated airlines of capacity, frequencies
and types of aircraft to be used unhindered by the Bermuda 1 capacity
clauses;" 7
4. no limitation on the carriage of sixth freedom traffic;
5. encouragement of low tariffs, set by individual airlines on the basis
of the forces of the marketplace without reference to the ratemaking
machinery of IATA;
6. minimal governmental interference in tariff matters;" ' and
7. inclusion of provisions on charter flights, i.e., the availability of
cheap charter air services is encouraged and charterworthiness is governed
by the country of origin rule."9
Many nations which have entered into this new kind of bilateral air
transport agreement with the United States have done so for a price.
Sometimes that price has been an exchange for a larger number of gateways
for their carriers in the United States, especially in the sunbelt (i.e., Atlanta,
Los Angeles, Miami). It seems fair to assume that foreign governments will
only enter into liberal post-Bermuda 2 type agreements if such action is to
their advantage. Not only do foreign carriers receive additional gateways in
the United States, they also manage to get an extremely large share of the
air transport market. It seems, for instance, that the Dutch carrier KLM has
close to ninety percent of the total U.S.-Netherlands market and that the
remaining ten percent is shared between several U.S. carriers. The United
States may have enunciated its liberal deregulation policy for largely
117. See supra at 250.
118. Some minor form of governmental control over tariffs has been retained.
Under the early version of post-Bermuda 2 agreements, the country of origin rule is
applied to tariffs (both scheduled and non-scheduled), i.e., tariffs can only be dis-
approved by the aeronautical authorities of the country where the traffic originates.
Under the later version the system of dual or mutual disapproval is applied, i.e., tariffs
determined by individual airlines can only be invalidated by disapproval of the aero-
nautical authorities of both contracting parties.
119. See supra at 259.
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consumer-oriented purposes. The main thrust of these purposes is to make
international air transport available to the public as extensively and as
cheaply as possible. Those foreign governments accepting this policy seem to
have done so not so much for ideological purposes, but, more for the
commercial benefit of their flag carriers.
NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
Bilateral air transport negotiations are usually held by negotiating
teams composed of representatives from such ministries as the foreign affairs
ministry,120 and the transportation ministry of the respective government,'
"2
with interested carriers either as observers 2 or as full-fledged delegation
members. In many countries, the carriers often do the groundwork for
bilateral negotiations with governmental authorities only stepping in at a
later stage.
In principle, bilateral air transport negotiations are conducted for the
purpose of serving civil aviation interests. In practice, however, many other
considerations often enter into the negotiating process. These other consider-
ations may be political, military or economic in nature.' 3 Also, in the
negotiation of bilateral air transport agreements, many nations have their
bilateral agreements, which usually are registered with ICAO' 4 and thus in
the public domain, accompanied by secret memoranda of understanding. This
is a highly undesirable practice. These secret memoranda often totally
change the meaning of a bilateral air transport agreement, for instance, from
a Bermuda 1 type agreement into a predetermination type agreement.
The implementation of bilateral air transport agreements into domestic
law is done in accordance with the constitutional laws of each contracting
party.' 5 In countries where bilateral agreements have the status of treaties
- this is the exception rather than the rule - and are ratified by
Parliament, they either form part of domestic law automatically (the civil law
tradition) or they do so once implementing legislation has been passed (the
120. In the United States, the State Department is the equivalent of the foreign
affairs ministry.
121. In the United States, the Department of Transportation is the equivalent. In
the United States, representatives of the CAB also participate in bilateral neogitations.
122. In the United States, the carriers are represented through observers appointed
by their trade associations: ATA (Air Transport Association of America) for scheduled
airlines; NACA (National Air Carrier Association) for supplemental airlines.
123. See, e.g., Haanappel, supra note 60, at 75.
124. See supra note 2 (Article 83).
125. See generally Gertler, Bilateral Air Transport Agreements: Non-Bermuda Re-
flections, 42 J. OF AIR L. AND COM. 779, 807 (1976).
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British tradition). In the United States, bilateral air transport agreements
have the status of executive agreements, signed under the executive power of
the President and not submitted to the Senate for advice and consent.
In all those countries - and they are a majority - where bilateral air
transport agreements do not take the form of inter-state treaties, but rather
the form of intergovernmental agreements, one needs (a) domestic aviation
legislation which is consistent with the bilateral agreements and vice versa,
and (b) domestic legislation which is strong enough to give aeronautical
authorities the power to implement the provisions of bilateral agreements. In
the absence of enabling domestic legislation, powers conferred upon aero-
nautical authorities in bilateral agreements often cannot be exercised. 2 ' As
Lord Denning, M.R., remarked in an English Court of Appeal decision
regarding Bermuda 1127: "[The Bermuda agreement] is a useful illustration as
to what Governments have agreed between [sic] themselves," but it forms no
part of British municipal law."a
ICAO STUDIES
Since the beginning of the 70s and especially upon the insistence of
developing nations, ICAO has been actively engaged in a large number of
studies on the economic aspects of international civil aviation.'29 In addition
to undertaking studies,"' the organization has set up a Panel of Experts on
the Regulation of Air Transport Services"' and a Panel of Experts on the
Machinery for the Establishment of International Fares and Rates.'32 It has
also convened two worldwide Special Air Transport Conferences, the first of
which was held in 1977"11 and the second in February 1980.' '
126. Cf. supra note 48 and text thereto.
127. Pan-American World Airways v. Department of Trade 119761 1 Lloyd's L.R.
257.
128. Id. at 260.
129. On ICAO in general, see BUERGENTHAL, LAW-MAKING IN TIE INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (1969).
130. See, e.g., Survey of International Air Transport Fares and Rates, ICAO Circ.
123-AT/33 (1974); Policy Concerning Non-Scheduled Air Transport, ICAO Circ. 136-
AT/42 (1977); Regulation of Capacity in International Air Transport Services, ICAO
Circ. 137-AT/43 (1977); Tariff Enforcement, ICAO Circ. 135-AT/41 (1977); Regional
Differences in Fares, Rates and Costs for International Air Transport, ICAO Circ. 144-
AT/49 (1977).
131. For the Panel's latest report, see ATRP/3-Report (1979).
132. For the Panel's latest report, see FRP/4-Report (1979).
133. Special Air Transport Conference Report, ICAO Doc. 9199, SATC (1977).
134. See ICAO, AT Conf. 2, Second Air Transport Conference, Montreal, 12-28 Feb-
ruary 1980, Documentation.
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The main topics of concern to ICAO member states have been the
following: the relationship between scheduled and non-scheduled internation-
al air services; capacity regulation in international air transport; interna-
tional ratemaking procedures, through IATA or otherwise; and tariff
enforcement.'" Since the Second Air Transport Conference of 1980, aviation
fuel scarcity and sharply rising fuel prices can be added to this list.
Although the several Panels and Conferences have adopted numerous
recommendations and resolutions, very little concrete action has emerged
from ICAO's efforts. The Panels and Conferences seem to function more as a
worldwide forum, where developed and developing, Western and socialist
nations can air their often diametrically opposed views. In itself, of course,
this may be extremely helpful.
-In the field of bilateral air transport agreements, the only really tangible
result of ICAO's recent economic work has been the adoption by the ICAO
Council of a Standard Bilateral Tariff Clause." The Clause is for guidance of
ICAO member states in the conclusion of their bilateral air transport
agreements. In many ways, the Clause comes close to the 1967 International
Agreement on the procedure for the establishment of tariffs for scheduled air
services.3 ' There are, however, important differences. First of all, the Clause
is drafted in such terms that it could conceivably be applied not only to
scheduled but also to non-scheduled international air services. Furthermore,
there is no explicit reference to IATA, but rather an implicit one:
(3) The tariffs . . . shall, if possible, be agreed by the designated
airlines of both Contracting Parties, after discussion with their respec-
tive governments and consultation, if applicable, with other airlines.
(4) Such agreement. . . shall, wherever possible, be reached by the
use of the appropriate international rate fixing mechanism.
The traditional system of filing and governmental approval of tariffs is
maintained. 38 Governmental approval may be express or tacit.' 39 Tariffs, once
approved and in force, remain in force until new ones have been established
or until twelve months after the date on which they otherwise would have
expired. "' Finally, contracting parties are under an obligation to investigate
135. See also the titles of the studies, supra note 130.
136. ICAO Doc. 9228-c/10 36 (1978).
137. See supra at p. 256.
138. Paragraphs (5) and (6).
139. There are two alternatives in paragraph (6); the first for express approval and
disapproval; the second for implicit approval. Cf. supra note 83 and text thereto.
140. Cf. supra note 84 and text thereto.
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and punish tariff violations (rebates) by airlines, agents, tour organizers and
freight forwarders.'
It is clear that this ICAO tariff clause has been drafted without regard
for the country of origin pricing rule or the dual tariff disapproval rule, as
contained in U.S. post-Bermuda 2 bilateral air transport agreements.' More
generally, at the Second Air Transport Conference of 1980, a majority of
nations has shown itself to be somewhat uneasy about the recent liberal
trend in U.S. international civil aviation policy. The CAB Show Cause Order
which might eventually take all antitrust immunity away from IATA
ratemaking activities,' 3 has come under attack and strong support has been
shown for the survival of IATA. In relation to capacity, the new U.S. "free
determination" policy"'4 has received a lukewarm reception, states generally
being inclined to give preference to either a predetermination type capacity
regulation or a Bermuda 1-type capacity regulation.
CONCLUSION
Bilateral air transport agreements can be looked upon as international
trade agreements in which sovereign states attempt to secure a fair share of
the international air transport market for their flag carriers. Such a "fair
exchange" approach would militate in favor of Bermuda 1-type agreements or
even in favor of predetermination type agreements. The picture, however,
may change somewhat if one takes into consideration the "public utility"
aspect of international civil aviation.'4' Under that generally accepted
concept, sovereign states try to promote safe, cheap and efficient air transport
for the entire world public. Such a goal is most often served best by a policy of
regulated competition. Carriers compete under governmentally-issued rules
and under governmental supervision. This attitude, it is suggested, would
advocate Bermuda 1-type agreements. Some of the world's air transport
markets, however, have become so "mature" in approaching a perfect market
situation with a large number of suppliers (airlines) that the public may be
better served by a policy of free competition. At the present time, this seems to
be the case only for U.S. domestic air transport, for the North Atlantic
market and possibly for the intra-European market. In "mature" internation-
al markets, experiments with post-Bermuda 2-type free competition bilater-
als seem to be warranted. In all other markets, however, where there are few
141. Paragraph (10).
142. See supra note 118 and text thereto.
143. See supra notes 43-44 and text thereto.
144. See supra at 253.
145. Cf. PILLAI, THE AIR NET. THE CASE AGAINST THE WORLD AVIATION CARTEL 2
(1969).
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suppliers (airlines) and where the market situation approached an oligopoly,
the public may be better served by a system of governmentally-regulated
competition in the form of Bermuda 1-type agreements. "6 Stringent predeter-
mination type agreements seem to be justified only for a number of
developing nations wishing to protect their young carriers from too much
foreign airline competition.
146. Australia's new international civil aviation policy contains an interesting new
system: capacity, frequency and type of aircraft to be used come under a system of
governmental predetermination. Low non-IATA tariffs are allowed for point-to-point
transportation by third and fourth freedom carriers. See supra note 68, at 1.
